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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The &igest includes cases
that apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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ADMIRALTY

DEFINITION OF SEAMAN UNDER THE JONES ACT NEED NOT BE RESTRICTED TO PERSON ASSIGNED TO ONLY ONE VESSEL

An employee of a tugboat company, injured while carrying
canned goods from a docked tugboat, brought a negligence suit
for damages against the owner of the tugboat company. The defendant's records and payroll listed plaintiff as an officeworker,
but plaintiff claimed he was a seaman under the Jones Act since
he spent from eighty to ninety percent of his time aboard defendant's various vessels where he was employed painting, running
errands, and taking inventory. Although the jury found in the
plaintiff's favor, the district court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative granted a new trial.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment notwithstanding the
verdict based upon the construction of Offshore Co. v. Robison,
266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), which allows the permanent assignment of a seaman to more than one vessel. According to the appellate court, the plaintiff could qualify for the status of seaman
because he spent a significant amount of time aboard defendant's
various tugboats where his duties contributed to the function and
maintenance of the vessels. The trial court's grant of a new trial
was upheld, however, because the only witness who had supported the plaintiff's story was the plaintiff. Significance-This
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decision sanctions a very broad definition of seaman under the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, and does not restrict the definition
to a person assigned only to one vessel. Leo Bazile v. Bisso
Marine Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1979).
FOURTH AMENDMENT DoEs NOT BAR WARRANTLESS FISHING VESSEL SEARCHES AUTHORIZED BY THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 TO PROTECT FISHERIES IN THE CONSERVATION ZONE

Warrantless United States Coast Guard officers boarded and
inspected a Japanese vessel fishing by license in the conservation
zone established under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1801-61 (1976). The officers seized the vessel when the inspection revealed that the daily
catch was being underlogged in violation of the FCMA. In an action by the United States for forfeiture of the seized vessel, the
vessel's owners moved to dismiss on the ground that the warrantless search and seizure violated the fourth amendment. The district court denied the motion, holding that the warrantless
searches authorized by the FCMA fall within a carefully defined
exception to the fourth amendment prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures. Relying on United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972) and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the court found that the exception applies to searches authorized by statute of licensees in industries
that are closely regulated and supervised. The court reasoned
that the case was within the exception because the fishing industry has traditionally been subject to close supervision due to federal interest in conservation and protection of the livelihood of
U.S. fishermen. The court cautioned that such warrantless
searches are limited to enforcement of the FCMA and cannot be
used to enforce other statutes or discover other criminal activity.
Finally, the court noted that in accepting the license to fish in the
conservation zone the vessel's owners agreed to the regulations incorporated into the license and were thereby put on notice of the
possibility of a warrantless search and seizure. Significance-The
fourth amendment guarantee of freedom from warrantless
searches does not apply to warrantless searches of vessels licensed
under the FCMA when such searches are for the purpose of enforcing that act. United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223
(D. Alaska 1979).
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2.

ALIENS' RIGHTS

PROPERLY EXTRADITED FUGITIVE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL HEARING CHALLENGING ENLARGEMENT OF ORIGINAL WARRANT OF
SURRENDER

A fugitive petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the
Secretary of State to revoke the consent of the United States to
an expansion of its original warrant of surrender which authorized petitioner's extradition to Italy. Petitioner contended that
the enlargement of his extradition to include additional crimes
without a judicial hearing violated his rights under the United
States Constitution, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976), and the relevant
treaty. Dismissing the petition, the district court held that petitioner was not entitled to a second hearing after he had been
properly extradited. The court noted that the statutory requirement for a hearing dealt only with proceedings prior to the prisoner's surrender. Upon the proper completion of extradition, petitioner has lost the due process rights accorded in the United
States. The court limited the judicial role in extradition proceedings to the finding of probable cause and asserted that a judicial
review of expansion of the original warrant of surrender would
constitute a breach of the separation of powers doctrine. Significance-This case of first impression determined that due process
safeguards in an extradition proceeding remain in effect only until a fugitive has been properly extradited. Berenguer v. Vance,
473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979).
VISA NUMBERS WRONGFULLY CHARGED AGAINST WESTERN HEMISPHERE QUOTAS ARE REISSUED ACCORDING TO AN HISTORICAL APPROACH RATHER THAN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

Visa numbers assigned to Cuban refugees under the Cuban Adjustment Act were wrongfully charged against Western Hemisphere immigration quotas, thereby making those visa numbers
unavailable to applicants from Western Hemisphere countries
other than Cuba. Western Hemisphere applicants on the visa
waiting list instituted a class action suit to require chronological
redistribution of the erroneously charged visa numbers without
regard to a national origin. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) sought to correct the mistake by reallocating the
charged visa numbers in accordance with the historical immigration patterns for the countries involved. The district court found
that all clais members had standing to sue and ordered reissuance
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of the visa numbers according to strict chronological order. A stay
was granted pending appeal. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that the INS must reissue the visa numbers
based on the historical immigration pattern. Significance-The
historical approach of reissuance will bypass many of the Mexicans currently at the top of the visa waiting list in favor of nonMexicans with a lower priority standing. Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d
978 (7th Cir. 1979).
3.

CUSTOMS AND TRADE REGULATIONS

PAYMENT OF IRREVOCABLE LETTER OF CREDIT MAY NOT BE ENJOINED ON GROUNDS OF INSTABILITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

An Iranian governmental agency, Khuzestan Light and Power,
sought to purchase telephone poles from the Dutch corporation
KMW, whose principal forestry operations were located in the
United States. Khuzestan received an irrevocable letter of credit
to guarantee KMW's performance. As Iran's subsequent Islamic
revolution raised the question of continuity of contract with the
new revolutionary government, KMW sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Chase Manhattan Bank from tendering payment on the irrevocable letter of credit. The District Court
granted the injunction. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the circumstances of the Iranian revolution typified
the risks and hazards born by a corporation engaged in international trade and such risks were insufficient to release a party
from its obligations since the negotiability of an irrevocable letter
of credit remains independent from the underlying obligation.
The court also reaffirmed the traditional rule that the State Department's decision to recognize the Iranian government could
not be overturned by any judicial body. Significance-This case
indicates the Second Circuit's continued unwillingness to violate
traditional commercial law, even in light of the instability of a
foreign government. KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606
F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979).
4.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

EXPROPRIATION OF A CONTRACTUAL RIGHT DOES NOT TRIGGER THE
HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT EXCEPTION TO THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE

In 1973 Libya nationalized Nelson B. Hunt's fifty year drilling
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concession, promising him suitable future compensation and assigning his drilling rights to AGECO, Libya's wholly owned national corporation. Before the specifics of compensation had been
determined, AGECO sold petroleum drilled from Hunt's former
concession to Coastal States Gas Producing Company and Hunt
subsequently sought recovery for conversion of the petroleum.
The lower courts held that the Act of State Doctrine prohibited
judicial inquiry into the expropriation related question. The
Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a contract does not
constitute a claim of title or other right to property, and hence
does not fall within the statutory exception to the Act of State
Doctrine provided in 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), popularly known as
the Hickenlooper Amendment. Despite a vigorous dissent that
demonstrated Congress' intent to include contractual rights to
property within the Amendment, the Court found that the governing Libyan concession granted only drilling rights and not title
to the petroleum itself. Significance-The instant case manifests
the continued vigor of the Act of State Doctrine, and specifically
indicates that future courts will define the property rights exception of the Hickenlooper Amendment very narrowly. Nelson
Bunker Hunt et al v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company, 22
Tex. S. Ct. J. 424 (June 1979).
5.

LABOR RELATIONS

MULTIPLE-USER DOCK OWNED BY THIRD PARTY MAY BE A PRIMARY
PICKETING SITUS IF PICKETING DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH OTHER
EMPLOYERS

In a union strike against plaintiff's storage facility on the Gulf
of Mexico, the union picketed at the main entrance to the facility,
at the access road to an abutting dock, and in the surrounding
waters. Plaintiff and two other employers used the dock, which
was owned by a third party. The picketing did not interfere with
the other employers' activities. Plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that
defendant's actions constituted secondary picketing on a common
situs in violation of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4)(i), (ii)(B). On appeal from
an NLRB dismissal, the court of appeals held that when a dock is
used by several employers but strikers picket only when employers unrelated to the strike are absent, the dock is not a common
situs and any such picketing is primary activity. Analogizing the
dock facility to the third-party-owned, multiple-user railroad spur
in United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.), 376 U.S. 492
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(1964), the court found both that vessels at the dock performed
work related to plaintiff's normal business, and that the dock was
not a common situs due to to the following factors: (1) the dock
was contiguous to plaintiff's property and was leased by plaintiff,
(2) no attempt was made to interfere with the other businesses,
(3) no other place was suitable to publicize the strike, (4) the
dock was the vessels' entrance to plaintiff, and (5) the situs was
related to plaintiff's everyday business activity. Significance-This decision extends the CarrierCorp. primary situs rational to access-road and boat picketing of docks. Anchirtank,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 601 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.
1979).

